INTRODUCTION
In Harris v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Alabama capital sentencing scheme. 1 Chief among the provisions of the sentencing scheme is that the jury issues an advisory sentence which the sentencing judge must consider in imposing a sentence. Although the provision does not specify the weight a judge must give to the jury's advisory verdict, 2 the majority concluded that this provision does not violate the Eighth Amendment since it does not result in arbitrary or capricious sentences. 3 This Note concludes that, contrary to the majority's assertions, Alabama's scheme violates the Eighth Amendment since it results in arbitrary and capricious sentences. This Note examines Alabama's scheme in light of (1) statements made by the Court in earlier death penalty cases regarding the constitutional requirements imposed by the Eighth Amendment, (2) sentencing processes in general, and (3) the consequences of Alabama's scheme. This Note argues that the standards imposed by the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the Court mandate a scheme that provides more guidance to the sentencer than the Alabama scheme. This necessity, recognized in previous holdings and statements in dicta issued by the Court, is evident given the fact that a certain amount of arbitrariness already exists in any sentencing procedure as a result of the incalculable number of outside factors that can effect a judge's sentence. This Note further maintains that an examination of the differing standards employed by the Alabama trial court judges in their sentencing opinions is direct evidence of the arbitrary results of the Alabama sentencing scheme. Although the Court is not responsible for providing this guidance, the
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Court deemed that such arbitrariness violated the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment. 25 As a result of the Furman decision, all existing death penalty statutes were declared unconstitutional by the Court 26 since the statutes were being selectively applied. 27 Following the Furman decision, states revised their capital sentencing schemes. 28 Various defendants challenged these revised sentencing schemes, arguing that they were unconstitutional under the new mandates set forth in Furman. 29 Importantly, in Proffitt v. Florida, 3 0 the Supreme Court declared that the death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment. For instance, in Gregg v. Georgia, the defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of armed robbery, 3 2 and was sentenced to death by the jury. 3 3 This sentence was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court.
3 4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine the constitutionality of the Georgia capital sentencing scheme. 35 The Court stated, " [W] here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 36 In Woodson v. North Carolina, 3 7 the Court addressed the constitutionality of the North Carolina capital sentencing scheme. The defendants in Woodson were found guilty of murder and armed robbery and were sentenced to death by the jury, as was required by state statute. - 45 and Delaware,4 have developed capital sentencing systems whereby the jury issues an advisory sentence, but the judge imposes the final sentence and, in doing so, can override the jury's advisory sentence. 47 The Supreme Court first analyzed the constitutionality of such sentencing systems under Florida's sentencing statute. 48 The specific provisions of the Florida to death provided, in part, "A murder which shall be... committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony, shall be deemed murder in the first degree and shall be punishable by death." N.C. GEN (1976) (plurality opinion) and Woodson, 428 U.S. 280 (plurality opinion). The Court found that the schemes adopted in both of these states violated the Eighth Amendment because they mandated the death penalty for defendants convicted of certain crimes. Russell, supra note 28, at 9. For a complete discussion of the new sentencing schemes, see Russell, supra note 28, at 9-10. 43ALA . CODE § 13A-5-47(e). 59 the Court declared that Florida could allow the jury to play an advisory role in sentencing, vesting sentencing authority in the judge. 60 The Court reasoned that the "Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a state reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws." ' 
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1417 SUPREME COURT REVIEW During police questioning, Harris revealed that she and her husband had been experiencing marital problems and that she was having an affair with McCarter.
8 7 When asked if McCarter could have killed her husband, Harris responded that she did not know, but if he had, she had not told him to do so. 88 Harris also revealed that she was [Vol. 86 1418 CAPITAL SENTENCING the beneficiary of several insurance policies that had been taken out on her husband's life. 8 9 The police arrested Harris after questioning. 90 McCarter agreed to testify against Harris in exchange for the prosecutor's promise not to seek the death penalty against him. 9 '
A jury convicted Harris of capital murder. 9 2 At the sentencing hearing before the trial court, several witnesses testified about Harris's good character and background. 9 3 They stated that she was raising seven children, held three jobs simultaneously, and participated actively in her church. 94 As a result, the jury recommended that Harris be sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole, instead of being sentenced to death. 95 Of the twelve jurors, seven voted for life without parole and five voted for death by electrocution. Upon receiving the jury's recommendation, the trial judge considered Harris's sentence and found one aggravating circumstance and two mitigating circumstances. 97 Thejudge found the fact that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain to be an aggravating circumstance. 98 The judge found the fact that Harris did not have a criminal record to be a statutory mitigating factor and determined that her upstanding character as a hardworking churchgoer was a non-statutory mitigating factor. 9 9 Determining that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors, the trial judge rejected the jury's recommendation and sentenced Harris to death. 0 0
Harris appealed her sentence, contending that the Alabama capital sentencing scheme was unconstitutional since it failed to give proper guidance regarding the amount of weight to accord the jury's recommended sentence to the sentencing judge.' 0 ' The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Harris's conviction and sentence, noting that Alabama's death penalty statute is based on Florida's sentencing scheme, a scheme which has been held constitutional by the 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW weight to the jury's recommended sentence. 03 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Alabama law, which vests ultimate sentencing power in the trial judge but requires the judge to consider ajury's advisory sentence, violates the Eighth Amendment by failing to specify the weight the judge must accord the jury's recommendation.
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A.
THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion' 0 4 which affirmed the decisions of the Supreme Court of Alabama, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, and the trial court.' 0 5 The Supreme Court held that Alabama's sentencing scheme does not violate the Eighth Amendment even though it does not specify how much weight a sentencing judge must accord ajury's advisory sentencing verdict. 10 6 Although the Court previously upheld the constitutionality of the Florida sentencing scheme, which specifies the weight a judge must accord a jury's advisory sentence, Justice O'Connor stated that such a scheme is not constitutionally mandated. 10 7 Rather, the Court held that Alabama's scheme, which only requires that a sentencing judge "consider" a jury's advisory sentence without specifying the precise weight the judge must accord it, was constitutional. The Court's opinion began with a comparison of Alabama's and Florida's sentencing procedures.' 0 9 In both Alabama and Florida the reviewing courts must weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in order to determine the appropriateness of the death penalty. 110 Additionally, the courts must decide whether, in light of the circumstances, the death penalty is excessive."'
The majority recognized, however, that although both states require the jury's participation in the sentencing process, the two schemes differ. 112 In Florida, as provided by the Florida Supreme Court, the sentencing judge must accord "great weight""1 3 to the CAPITAL SENTENCNG142 jury's advisory sentence and not overrule it unless "the facts suggesting a sentence of death [are] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ." 1 14 This, however, is not the case in Alabama. 115 Justice O'Connor noted that the Alabama sentencing statute only requires the sentencing judge to "consider" the jury's recommendation and further observed that the Alabama courts have not read any further requirements into the statute.
116
Justice O'Connor proceeded to discuss past Supreme Court cases which reviewed the Florida sentencing scheme. 117 She began by noting the Court's decision in Spaziano v. Rorida, 118 which declared Florida's sentencing procedure to be constitutional. 119 In Spaziano, the Court concluded that a jury could play an advisory role in sentencing. 1 2 0 Justice O'Connor agreed with the proposition set forth in Spaziano that it is constitutional for ajudge, rather than ajury, to sentence a criminal to death.' 21 Next, Justice O'Connor discussed the Court's favorable impressions of the Florida sentencing scheme.' 2 2 For instance, the Court in Dobbert v. Forida 12 5 lauded the "crucial protection" provided by the Tedder standard. 24 However, Justice O'Connor noted, the fact that the Court approved of and appreciated the Tedder standard did not mean that the Tedderstandard was a constitutional imperative. 125 The amount of weight a judge accords a jury's verdict is less important than "whether the scheme adequately channels the sentencer's discretion so as to prevent arbitrary results."
126
The Court then determined that the Constitution does not require that any specific weight be accorded to particular factors, including both aggravating and mitigating factors. 127 Justice O'Connor next discussed the number of advisory jury verdicts that judges have overruled in Alabama, 29 noting that judges override recommendations of life imprisonment much more often than recommendations of the death penalty. 130 Justice O'Connor cautioned that the statistics are not indicative of the statute's constitutionality. 31 Rather, the statistics might reflect the fact that the statute does not achieve the effect that its enactors desired. 13 2 That is, perhaps the Alabama sentencing scheme results in more defendants being sentenced to death than the legislature had intended when it enacted the sentencing scheme.' 3 3 If that is the case, Justice O'Connor noted, the legislature should amend the sentencing scheme; the Court should not declare it unconstitutional. The majority rejected the proposition put forth in Justice Stevens's dissent' 35 that the jury's verdict must be accorded great weight because it best reflects community standards.' 3 6 Justice O'Connor reasoned that it is not the Court's role to determine how a state can best mete out punishments. 3 7 The Court has no jurisdiction over those matters to the extent that they involve only policy issues.' 3 8 The only power the Court does have is to determine whether legislation comports with the Constitution. 3 9 Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded, the Court's only role in Harris was to determine the constitutionality of the Alabama sentencing scheme, and not to legislate by rewriting the Alabama scheme.
140
The majority also rejected the arguments put forth by Petitioner Harris regarding the roles of the judge and the jury in the Alabama sentencing scheme. 14 1 Harris maintained that the jury's role in Alabama was more than advisory and that the jury, not the judge, held the key sentencing role.' 4 2 Harris reasoned that there would be no need for sentence reversal where the jury was exposed to prejudicial error unless the jury's role in the sentencing was the key one.
14 3 She 
B. JUSTICE STEVENS'S DISSENT
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that Alabama's sentencing scheme violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it failed to guide sentencing judges in their treatment of jury verdicts.1 5 0 To support his position, Justice Stevens discussed the role of the jury, stating that the jury verdict is supposed to embody the voice of the community. 15 1 He, therefore, concluded that this community voice should guide the ultimate decision of whether the citizen whom the jury has found guilty should be sentenced to death.' 5 2 Justice Stevens reasoned that the death penalty is different than any other punishment because its only goal is retribution-and retribution is something the community should determine. Justice Stevens cited the potential for the Alabama sentencing scheme to subject criminals to double jeopardy as another indication of the scheme's unconstitutionality. 154 By subjecting the defendant to the jury's advisory sentence and then to the sentencing judge's sen- 
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1423 SUPREME COURT REVIEW tence, Justice Stevens argued, the Alabama scheme effectively places the criminal's life in jeopardy twice and, therefore, should be declared unconstitutional. 55 Justice Stevens next discussed the problems with vesting too much authority in the sentencing judge. He pointed out that trial judges in Alabama face election every six years and thus might succumb to political pressures in making their decisions. 5 6 As a result, Justice Stevens argued, there are differences between the ways in which judges and juries impose sentences. 157 Such differences are apparent in the fact that Alabama judges have overridden only five death sentences in favor of sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment, but these same judges have "condemned [forty-seven] defendants whom juries would have spared." 5 8 As a result, Justice Stevens argued, the proper sentencing scheme is one in which the judge does not have a role. 1 59 To support this contention, Justice Stevens noted that throughout its history, the Court has recognized the importance of the jury's role in sentencing. 1 60 Thejury, composed of members of the community, should be the body responsible for meting out the ultimate sentencing judgment of one of its members.' 6 ' Justice Stevens stated: "Death sentences imposed by judges over contrary jury verdicts do more than countermand the community's judgment: they express contempt for that judgment." 62 Justice Stevens claimed that Florida's Tedder standard is necessary in order to ensure that the sentence imposed upon the defendant 155 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) Despite the Court's correct assertion that the Tedder standard is not constitutionally mandated, the Court was incorrect in holding that Alabama's sentencing scheme does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, 170 and, according to Furman v. Georgia, it requires that sentences not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously.1 7 ' Alabama's sentencing scheme violates the Furman mandates by giving unbridled discretion to the sentencing judge. This Section begins with a discussion of the constitutional imperatives imposed on legislatures by the Eighth Amendment in enacting their sentencing schemes. Next, the Note examines the effects the Alabama sentencing scheme has on the sentences of convicted defendants in Alabama. The Note then explores judicial bias in sentencing and the political pressures judges face in making sentencing decisions. Finally, the Note examines Justice O'Connor's reasoning and explores its 163 Id. at 1042 (Stevens, J, dissenting). 164 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 165 Id. at 1042-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 166 Id. at 1042 (StevensJ, dissenting). 167 Id. (Stevens, J, dissenting) 
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A. THE REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED BY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Constitution protects against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. 172 Before Furman, the Court had stated, "Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or lingering death....
[Cruel] implies there is something inhuman and barbarous-something more than the mere extinguishment of life."' 17 The Supreme Court, in Furman, expanded the definition of cruel and unusual punishment to include sentencing schemes which result in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of sentences. 174 That is, the reach of the Eighth Amendment was expanded to cover entire sentencing schemes rather than just individual sentences. Whereas before Furman, only a punishment that was deemed "barbaric" or similarly disdainful would be violative of the Eighth Amendment, now "[i]t would seem incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices. "175 In addition, "it is 'cruel and unusual' to apply the death penalty-or any other penalty-selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of the same penalty across the board." 176 Thus in Furman, the Court held that any imposition of a punishment in an arbitrary or capricious manner is unconstitutional. 177 AsJustice Stewart stated, "the Eighth... Amendmen[t] can-the Eighth Amendment and the definition of "cruel and unusual," see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). A view similar to that expressed in Kemmler is held by Justice Scalia. Scalia stated that the Eighth Amendment: (1) only prohibits cruel and unusual punishment; (2) "does not, by its terms, regulate the procedures of sentencing as opposed to the substance of punishment; and (3) only applies to sentencing schemes when they "are of such a nature as systematically to render the infliction of a cruel punishment 'unusual.'" Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
174 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (Stewart, J., concurring). 175 Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). 176 Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring).
177 See id at 310 (StewartJ,. concurring). In fact, two Justices concluded that the death penalty itself was cruel and unusual punishment, and thus any capital punishment scheme was unconstitutional on its face. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); Furman, 408 U.S. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also jones v. Alabama, cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 1063 (1985) (Marshall,J, dissenting). justice Brennan joinedJustice Marshall's dissent in the denial of certiorari, stating-"I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) .
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not tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed." 178 Moreover, the Court has concluded that sentencing schemes that contain improper guidance to the sentencer violate the Eighth Amendment. 79 Specifically, any punishment imposed on a "whim, passion, [or] prejudice" violates the Eighth Amendment. 8 0 The underlying purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to ensure that the states' power to inflict punishments is "exercised within the limits of civilized standards."' 8 ' The punishments resulting from such schemes are deemed cruel and unusual because they are by nature arbitrary and discriminatory. 8 2 Any time extrinsic factors are able to enter a sentencing decision, and any time proper guidance is not given to the sentencer, there is a greater chance that an arbitrary sentence will result by virtue of the fact that the sentencer has too much leeway. This is the case with Alabama's sentencing scheme.
In Alabama, where the judge is not given any guidance as to how much weight to accord the jury's recommendation, the exact "arbitrariness and capriciousness" which the Court sought to prevent in Furman can come into play.' 83 "[T]he death penalty's cruel and unusual nature is made all the more arbitrary and freakish when it is imposed by a judge in the face of ajury determination that death is an appropriate punishment." 8 4
A system like Florida's, where the judge is told to give the jury's recommendation "great weight" and not to reject the jury's recommendation unless the evidence in favor of a death sentence is "so clear and convincing that no reasonable person could differ" 18 5 prohibits arbitrariness. A Florida judge is accountable for his decision in a way an Alabamajudge is not, thus guaranteeing a less arbitrary sentence in Florida. "It approaches the most literal sense of the word 'arbitrary' to put one to death in the face of a contrary jury determination where it is accepted that the jury had indeed responsibly carried out its task. 
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Although it may be argued that if the Arizona, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska capital sentencing statutes have not been declared unconstitutional-and therefore are not cruel and unusual-despite the fact that they vest complete sentencing discretion in the judge, then a capital sentencing scheme which involves the jury as one of its components but vests ultimate decision-making power in the judge must be constitutional as well. Such an argument is not persuasive, however.
The Court has not declared that any specific scheme must be adopted, merely that the sentencing ultimately resulting from the scheme must not be arbitrary and capricious. Thus, a scheme whereby the judge has sole authority, provided it gives judges guidance and limits their discretion, may very well be constitutional. There is a big difference between a system where guidance is given and one in which it is not-no matter who makes the final sentencing decision.
187
Therefore, the ultimate question is not who has the power but how that power is controlled. 188 Guidance must be given to the jury even in states where the jury makes the sentencing decision. 189 In the states where complete sentencing power is relegated to the judge, the judge is told which aggravating and mitigating factors to consider and the weight to accord them.°9 0 Capital sentencing schemes must include the factors to be weighed and the weight they should be given, no matter who is making that decision. Unless each factor is neatly laid out and the weight to be accorded is detailed, the sentences resulting from it will necessarily be arbitrary since any sentencing body can use the factor as it chooses. This is the ultimate problem with Alabama's scheme: it requires a judge to consider the jury's recommendation without providing any guidance as to how much weight to give it. The real issue is not whether the judge or the jury is making there has been a life sentence determination by a properly selected and instructed jury which has been witness to all the evidence and arguments. Where such determination has been made, it must at least account for something." Id. at 1064 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188 In fact, a capital sentencing scheme in which the jury was simply instructed to sentence the defendant without providing any guidance as to the process the jury should use to formulate the sentence might be just as likely to result in arbitrary and capricious sentences as one where the judge was given such power.
189 For instance, under the sentencing scheme in Texas, where the jury makes the complete sentencing decision, the jury bases its sentencing decision on three determinations: the likelihood that the defendant will be dangerous in the future; whether the defendant intended to kill the victim or the defendant's level of responsibility for the victim's death; and whether there were any mitigating circumstances which would warrant a life sentence. 
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the ultimate sentencing decision but rather whether the scheme is so nebulous as to result in arbitrary and capricious sentences.
B. THE EFFECTS OF THE ALABAMA SENTENCING SCHEME
In twenty-nine of the thirty-seven states (seventy-eight percent) which permit capital punishment, the jury makes the final determination of the defendant's sentence. 19 1 The handful of other states which allow capital punishment allow the judge to play a role. As is discussed in more detail in part II.C., four states have capital sentencing procedures wherein the judge makes the sole determination of the defendant's sentence, and the other four states, including Alabama, have schemes which require the judge to consider the jury's recommended sentence.' 92 Clearly, in most states the greatest emphasis is placed on the jury's involvement in capital sentencing. The fact that judges may have ulterior motives in imposing sentences on defendants 193 may be reflected in the statutory sentencing schemes of these states.
In Alabama, the weight which judges accord jury recommendations varies greatly from judge to judge. 19 4 Some judges treat a life recommendation as a mitigating factor whereas others give great weight to jury recommendations. 195 Not only does the amount of weight accorded the jury's recommendation vary from judge to judge, but the weight that one judge accords it varies from case to case. bama in which it appears the judges gave little or no weight to the jury recommendation. 199 Of thirty-three cases where the judge overrode the jury's life sentence recommendation and sentenced the defendant to death, nineteen (fifty-eight percent) involved jury vote tallies where more than two-thirds of the jurors had voted for life imprisonment. 200 In fact, in four of the cases, the juries had unanimously voted for life imprisonment.
20 '
Alabama sentencing judges not only failed to give consistent weight to jury recommendations, they often failed to specify the reasoning behind their decisions in cases where they overrode the jury recommendations. 20 2 There were thirty-six jury overrides in Alabama between 1981 and 1991, and in nineteen of those cases "the trial court stated little more than that its independent examination found aggravating circumstances to exceed mitigating ones." 20 3
The trial judge in Harris seemingly gave little or no regard to the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, 20 4 making only a cursory mention of the jury's recommendation and then rejecting it. 205 The judge sentenced Harris to death without any explanation as to why or as to what role he allowed the jury recommendation to play in his sentencing decision other than to say that he "considered" it. 20 6 The manner in which judges have treated jury sentence recommendations provides no discernible pattern. 2 0 7 The amount of weight accorded to the advisory sentences varies from one judge to another as well as from one case to another. 20 8 This type of random, arbitrary sentencing mechanism is exactly the type of sentencing scheme which Furman and the Eighth Amendment seek to prevent.
C. THE REALITIES OF SENTENCING
Who makes the ultimate sentencing decision-the judge or the jury-and how much weight that decision-maker gives to the other's recommendation is something that can be controlled both statutorily and through common law mandates like the Tedder standard. Unfortunately, there are many other factors affecting sentencing over which how to cast their votes.
judges and the legislature have little control. These factors include judicial bias based on race 20 9 and the political pressures that are placed on judges to be tough on crime. 210 Given the fact that there is no easy way to control these factors and the fact that the Court wants to prevent arbitrary and capricious sentences, the Court should require sentencing schemes to provide greater guidance to the ultimate sentence-imposer. Such guidance will limit the potential effects of extrinsic factors by channeling the sentencer's decision.
Judicial Bias in Sentencing
Studies have shown that judicial bias has an effect on sentencing decisions. 2 1 1 However, the Court has rejected the use of statistical methods for proving constitutional violations in individual sentencing decisions when the statistics address broader discriminatory practices. 21 2 The Court was confronted with the issue of judicial bias in sentencing in McCleskey v. Kemp. 2 13 In McCleskey, the petitioner, an African-American man, sought to prove racial bias in his own sentencing by offering a study which showed racial bias in sentencing in general. 2 14 The Court allowed the evidence to be admitted but upheld the death sentence, in a five to four decision, reasoning that the petitioner failed to prove that there had been racial animus in his specific case. 2 The Baldus study was based on over 2,000 Georgia murder cases, and it examined data relating to the defendant's race, the victim's race, and the various combinations resulting therefrom. The study indicated that black defendants who killed white victims were the most likely to receive the death penalty. For a critique of the Baldus study see Howe, supra note 24 (describing the importance of the Badus study and questioning the authors' contention that equality in capital punishment on a statistically significant level is the goal of the Constitution 220 Brennan, 221 and Marshall 2 22 recognized this in their concurrences in the landmark Furman decision. As Justice Douglas stated,
[W] e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position. 223 Although the Court has acted to prevent racial bias in other aspects of the trial process, 224 controlling judicial bias in sentencing is difficult.
Since judges do not express racial bias when issuing their sentencing orders, the only way a defendant can prove such bias is through statistical methods, like those rejected in McCleskey. 225 The seriousness of the problem of racial bias has been recognized both by the Court and by Congress. 2 26 In addition to noting the fact that racial bias pervades sentencing, Justice Brennan noted the reasons why such bias is so egregious:
Considering the race of a defendant or victim in deciding if the death penalty should be imposed is completely at odds with this concern that an individual be evaluated as a unique human being. Decisions influenced by race rest in part on a categorical assessment of the worth of human beings according to color, insensitive to whatever qualities the individuals in question may possess. Enhanced willingness to impose the death sentence on black defendants, or diminished willingness to render such a sentence when blacks are victims, reflects a devaluation of the lives of black persons. When confronted with evidence that race more likely than not plays such a role in a capital-sentencing system, it is
